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Abstract: In popular culture, and in policy discussions, the internet is often conceived of as a
decentralised technology,  which cannot  be controlled.  Drawing from research into internet
infrastructure, focusing on the Border Gateway Protocol, I show that the internet has never
been,  and never  can be,  decentralised.  I  argue that  the internet  is  better  viewed as  being
distributed,  both  in  terms  of  technologies  and  governance  arrangements.  The  shift  in
perspective, from decentralised to distributed, is essential to understand the past and present
internet, and to imagine possible future internets which preserve and support the public good.
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INTRODUCTION
From its earliest days, the internet has been imagined as a space which holds the potential for a
freer and more democratic form of social organisation, eliminating the inequalities, regulations
and controls of societies run by governments and corporations. This social imaginary of the
internet relies upon a key assumption: that the internet cannot be controlled by any centralised
or territorial authority. Concerns that the internet is being subjected to centralised control and
regulation in the present invoke a past in which it was free from corporate and government
control, as "a world that is both everywhere and nowhere" (Barlow, 1996), and a future in which
it may be free again, constructed through technologies which are inherently “decentralised,
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radically  democratic”  (Granick,  2015).  Following  this  line  of  analysis,  the  most  enduring
responses to attempts to control the internet involve designing new technologies which are ever
more decentralised, capable of evading control.
The early internet did appear decentralised to its users, as they were able to create and use new
services without needing to seek permission from any third party. I share the concerns that the
everyday experience of the internet of today is increasingly controlled, through concentrations
of power in the ownership of media and platforms (Benkler, 2016; Lessig, 2001). However, as I
will show, the experiences of apparent decentralisation and control are both constructed over an
underlying infrastructure which was never decentralised, nor designed with decentralisation as
a goal.
I  argue  that  the  internet  is  better  conceived  of  as  a  distributed  system  –  rather  than  a
decentralised system – with varied centres and concentrations of power in its construction. This
is not simply a matter of semantics. A distributed imaginary of the internet calls to attention
institutions and practices, just as much as it does technology. In this analysis, responses to
concentrations of power cannot focus on technology as a mechanism for eliminating centralised
control. Instead, socially desirable outcomes (such as freedoms of speech and association) must
be addressed through appropriate combinations of political and technological interventions.
To make my argument, I examine the origins and evolution of a key technology of the internet:
the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is the technology which enables the interconnection of
separate networks to form the global internet. After all, the internet is not one network, but an
interconnected system of tens of thousands of individual networks.1 BGP enables the routing of
data between these individual networks. BGP is one of the most critical components of internet
infrastructure: in the absence of the interconnections between networks, there would be no
internet. Since the routing of data on the internet is managed through BGP, the analysis of the
internet as decentralised or distributed is in many ways defined by the characteristics of BGP,
making this protocol an essential object in the study of internet governance.
I  study  BGP  through  three  related  technological  features  which  are  fundamental  to  a
decentralised conception of the internet. First, packet switching, the mechanism through which
data is  broken up into individual  packets before transmission.  Second,  routing,  the means
through which routes are discovered and selected for the transmission of packets within and
between networks. Third, topology, the structure of the system of interconnections between the
networks  which  make  up  the  internet.  These  three  features  must  work  in  concert  if  a
decentralised internet is to be possible: communications are broken up into packets, which may
take different paths – chosen using a decentralised routing protocol – through the topology of
the internet. By examining these three features, I will show that decentralisation was not a
design goal, nor the actual outcome, in the creation and subsequent operation of BGP, and by
extension, of the internet; and I will illustrate why it is important to understand the internet as a
distributed – rather than decentralised – system.
I begin the paper with a brief review of debates in the governance of technology, focusing on
problems  of  control  in  the  development  and  operation  of  infrastructure.  In  the  following
sections,  I  trace the evolution of the relationships between technological  form, control and
topology which were required to govern internet routing. First, I examine the internet's earliest
incarnation, the ARPANET, in which routing was administered by a single organisation through
centralised control. Next, I follow the transition of routing in the ARPANET's successor, the
NSFNET,  which encompassed multiple  independently  administered networks,  with  routing
managed through a  hierarchical  network topology,  and corresponding hierarchical  control.
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Finally, I trace the operation of routing in the modern internet, in which topology takes the form
of a complex graph, administered through coordination between varying centres of power.
The historical approach that I adopt serves two purposes. First, it provides a comparative case
study of changing forms of governance across different periods in the history of the internet,
through distinct  articulations of  technological  form, control  and topology.  My analysis  and
method, I hope, will offer generalizable lessons for the study and design of internet technologies
and governance. Second, it traces the values and assumptions underlying the evolution of BGP
as a socio-technical system: values and assumptions which in many ways remain embedded in
the modern form of BGP. To make sense of the possibilities that the internet offers, it is essential
to understand the mechanisms through which its infrastructure – of which BGP is a critical
component – is governed.
SECTION 1: GOVERNING TECHNOLOGY
The problem underlying both centralised and decentralised visions of the internet is one of
governing  technology:  what  mechanisms  are  required  to  stabilise  and  order  the  global
technological infrastructure of the internet? The debate is over the form that these mechanisms
take, in promoting centralised control, or decentralised coordination; and over the social values
that users are able to realise in the resulting system.
While the subject of this debate – the internet – may be relatively new, the terms of the debate
are not. Mumford (1964) argues that authoritarianism and democracy breed particular types of
technologies, which encode the characteristics of the political system of their origin, providing
for  centralised/authoritarian  or  decentralised/democratic  control.  Winner  (1980)  presents
technologies  as  a  complex of  features,  with different  capacities  for  flexibility  or  rigidity  in
relation to the patterns of power and authority which make use of them, and which are needed
to  govern  them.  Like  Mumford,  the  cases  he  presents  rely  on  the  distinction  between
authoritarian  and  democratic  politics,  although  with  contingent  connections  between
technological and political form.
There  are  sharp  distinctions  to  the  debate  over  the  relationship  between  technology  and
governance, especially with regards to modern societies in which information is said to be a
dominant factor.  Beniger (1986) argues that centralised control,  implemented through new
bureaucratic  administrative  forms  and  the  use  of  information  technology,  is  essential  to
organising industrial production, telecommunications, transport and other large-scale elements
underpinning modern "information" societies. In contrast, Galloway contends that the internet
has created the conditions for the emergence of protocols, technologies of control which “cannot
be centralised” (Galloway, 2006, p. 11).
In these perspectives,  the governance of  technology is  constituted through the interactions
between administrative structure and technological form. Governance in a centralised system
functions through central bureaucratic administrative structures and technologies of control
that govern from above. Governance in a decentralised system relies on relationships between
individuals in flat social structures, enabled through technologies which support connection and
coordination, without any central control. However, these positions are inadequate to explain
the  nature  of  the  internet.  For  my  analysis,  I  supplement  administrative  structure  and
technological form with a third analytical category of topology: the arrangement of relationships
between entities in the system.
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The object of my study, BGP, is part of the internet's infrastructure, invisible to internet users
under  normal  conditions  (Edwards,  2003;  Star,  1999),  but  essential  to  the  stable,  reliable
operation of the internet. I draw from, and extend, two dominant perspectives on infrastructure
for this paper. The first focuses on the role of communities of practice, operating in situated
contexts, in the use and design of infrastructures (Bowker & Star, 2000; Star, 1999; Star &
Ruhleder,  1996).  The  second  engages  with  the  historical  evolution  of  technology  in  large
technical systems (Coutard, 1999; Hughes, 1983, 1987; Mayntz & Hughes, 1988), building on the
stages  of  development  established  in  Hughes  (1983),  from invention  and development,  to
technology transfer, to system growth, to the acquisition of technological and political-economic
momentum, to the rise of planned regional systems.
As valuable as these theories of infrastructure are, they fail to adequately develop a concept of
the topology of  infrastructure: the question of how the structure of  the networks in which
infrastructure is deployed (e.g., interconnected systems of canals, power distribution lines or
roads)  interact  with  the  development  of  practices,  standards  and  political  economy  of
infrastructure.
Studies of internet governance provide a starting point for developing a topological approach to
infrastructure.  It  is  well  established that  internet  governance is  constructed through social
networks and practices of ongoing coordination and collaboration, as much as through formal
institutional structures (Hofmann, Katzenbach, & Gollatz, 2016; Mueller, 2010; van Eeten &
Mueller, 2013). The aim of this strand of internet governance research is to understand the
mechanisms through which distributed practices of coordination and collaboration constitute
systems of governance.
My  contribution  to  these  theories  of  development  and  governance  of  technological
infrastructures  is  to  take  topology  as  a  central  problem in  the  analysis  of  governance,  to
understand  how  coordination,  collaboration,  and  power  relationships  function  through
topological  positions  and  structures.  I  consider  how  the  topological  forms  of  internet
infrastructure interact with the practices and social formations involved in operating internet
infrastructure; and how these interactions structure the governance of internet infrastructure. I
conceive of governance of infrastructure as premised upon situated, relational knowledge and
practices (Haraway, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991), constructed through specific positions in the
topology of infrastructure.
In my analysis, the power and authority required to engage in governance flow from topology
(Allen, 2011; Harvey, 2012). Governance is not a global constant, but is constructed across
varying  related  situated  contexts  in  the  topology  of  infrastructure.  Situated  contexts  of
governance  are  as  much  a  matter  of  actual  topological  positions  of  actors  within  an
infrastructure, as they are of the orbits of relations around actors, the circulation of practices
involved in operating infrastructure, and the technological forms of the infrastructure.
SECTION 2: METHODS AND DATA
My research involved historical study into the origins and operation of BGP. I focused on the
development of problems and technologies related to network interconnection, from the 1970s
when these problems and technologies were initially defined, to the mid-1990s, when BGP
matured as the key technology for network interconnection on the public internet. I analysed
publicly available standards and best practice documents, and email lists from the internet
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Engineering Task Force (IETF), which sets technical standards for the internet, focusing on
material related to BGP and prior related technologies. These included documents from the
IETF standards  process,  as  well  as  Internet  Engineering  Notes  (IENs),  an  earlier  form of
internet standards document. 2 I studied historical and contemporary computer science papers
related to BGP, and drew on first- and second-hand historical accounts of the development of
the internet.
Over the course of a larger project – an ethnography of technical personnel involved in the
operation of BGP – I conducted over 30 semi-structured interviews with individuals who were
involved in operating and building the early internet. I draw from these interviews to provide
first-hand  accounts  of  the  development  of  BGP  and  related  technologies.  I  recruited
interviewees through cold calls (and subsequent references) at meetings of the IETF, and of the
North American Network Operators Group (NANOG), the principal professional organisation
for the internet's technical personnel in the North American region.
Others have worked with similar material to study the manifestation of social values in the
internet standards process (Braman, 2011) or debates in standards development around the
transition from one internet protocol standard to another (DeNardis, 2009). In contrast, I am
not  concerned  with  the  standards  development  process,  so  much  as  with  the  connection
between specific features of a standard, the viable range of topological forms for related internet
infrastructure, and the forms of governance required to operate this infrastructure. As a result,
my focus in selecting interviewees and materials, and in analyzing this data, was as much on the
rationale behind particular protocol design decisions, as it was on the practices of those involved
in building and operating the infrastructure implementing a protocol.
SECTION 3: ROUTING PACKETS ACROSS THE INTERNET
The transmission of data across the internet takes place using a mechanism known as packet
switching, implemented in a core technology called the Internet Protocol (IP). Older circuit
switched networks required the entire circuit between two endpoints to be reserved for the
duration of a communication (as for a phone call). In contrast, packet switched networks break
up communications into individual packets of data, each of which can potentially take different
paths to their eventual destination, at which they are reassembled. Claims that the internet is
intrinsically decentralised often rest upon the capabilities of packet switching, through which
packets  are  able  to  take alternate  paths  as  required,  naturally  adapting to  congestion and
failures in internet infrastructure.
However, packet switching does not in itself support decentralisation. Two additional conditions
are  required:  there  must  be  a  diversity  of  routes  across  the  internet  sufficient  to  avoid
centralised control of routing, and there must be a sufficiently robust decentralised method for
constructing maps of these routes.
To  reach  destinations  on  the  internet,  packets  must  traverse  multiple  independently
administered networks, with routes determined by the routing protocols and policies applied to
the routers (the network components handling routing of data) in these networks. Routing
protocols define the standardised mechanisms through which routers learn about routes on a
particular network, and specify methods through which administrative policies may be applied
to the construction of routes. There is substantial complexity in the traversal of routes across the
internet.  The routers traversed may have different technical capabilities,  and have different
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behaviours,  depending  on  how they  are  configured,  their  manufacturer,  and  their  specific
model. Different networks may use different routing protocols within their borders, running
over network designs customised to their needs.
In order to interconnect networks across their borders – while allowing for variances within
networks – a common routing protocol must be used. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the
routing protocol which integrates diverse networks (termed "autonomous systems" by BGP) into
the global whole of the internet. The resulting system of interconnections amongst networks is
called the inter-domain routing system. The topology of the interconnected networks in the
modern inter-domain routing system is a complex graph, consisting of over 55,000 individual
networks as of this writing. 3
If the internet is intrinsically decentralised, then it is in the inter-domain routing system that
characteristics of decentralisation should be most visible. If the topology of the inter-domain
routing system is not decentralised, then all packets within global or regional contexts will have
to traverse a small set of networks, allowing these networks global or regional control over flows
of data on the internet. If the routing protocol – BGP – for the inter-domain routing system is
not decentralised, global or regional authorities will be able to control the routes that packets
take across the internet.
The technological  form of  routing protocols,  the  topological  organisation of  networks,  and
related  control  mechanisms are  key  concepts  for  the  analysis  of  the  inter-domain  routing
system. In the following sections, I deploy these concepts to analyse the evolution of the inter-
domain routing system, from the ARPANET to the present day.
SECTION 4: ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IN THE
ARPANET
The internet has its beginnings in the ARPANET, a network funded by the Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA) of the US Department of Defense, although developed in an academic
research  setting.  The  precursor  to  the  inter-domain  routing  system  was  a  system  of
interconnections  between  the  "gateway"  computers  which  provided  remote  access  to  the
networks of the organisations connected to the ARPANET. The first gateways for the ARPANET
– called Interface Message Processors (IMP) – were installed to connect four sites in 1969. They
were  all  constructed  on  the  same template,  with  simplicity  and  reliability  in  mind,  using
identical  hardware  and  software.  Each  IMP  provided  connectivity  for  a  time-sharing  host
computer that was connected to it. Users logged in to their local host computer could connect to
remote  sites  through  the  local  IMP,  which  transmitted  packets  to  their  destination  host
computers through one or more intermediary IMPs (Abbate, 1999).
The initial implementation of routing in IMPs was “adaptive”, seemingly decentralised. Each
IMP made decisions about how to route packets based on the quality of links to neighboring
IMPs. Changes in link quality were constantly measured by each IMP, and propagated around
the network as input for independent routing decisions at each IMP (Heart,  1969).  As the
ARPANET evolved, the design for IMPs was generalised into a standardised specification for
gateways,  which used a routing protocol  called the Gateway-to-Gateway Protocol  (GGP) to
determine  connectivity,  and  compute  routes  between  gateways  (Hinden  &  Sheltzer,  1982;
Strazisar, 1979; Strazisar & Perlman, 1978).
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The  development  of  adaptive  routing  on  the  ARPANET  faced  interlinked  technical  and
administrative challenges. The ARPANET developers were faced with technical problems such
as routing loops: conditions under which the failure of a link in one segment of the network led
to  packets  being  continually  forwarded  in  a  closed  loop  without  being  sent  on  to  their
destination (Strazisar & Perlman, 1978). New generations of IMP hardware were designed with
improved capabilities, but had to be integrated to co-exist with older IMPs. It was not feasible to
simply replace all the older IMPs, especially as the ARPANET grew to interconnect more sites,
and became a utility for everyday use, even while it  remained a platform for research and
development of the nascent internet protocols. The design of the ARPANET routing protocols
had to be pragmatic, to take into account the material and organisational impedances of a
diverse network interconnecting multiple institutions, built over potentially unreliable physical
telecommunications infrastructure.
Even though the GGP was designed to be adaptive, the diverse issues involved in operating the
ARPANET called for centralised administration. Host computers remained under the control of
their institutions, but the system of IMPs and their interconnections was centrally monitored
and managed, under a contract from ARPA to the firm of Bolt, Beranek and Newman (BBN).
The  centralised  management  of  this  system  became  ever  more  important  to  the  reliable
operation of the ARPANET, as it grew and became more complex, accommodating multiple
generations  of  IMP  hardware  and  software  which  had  to  be  able  to  inter-operate.  As  a
specification for the design and operation of gateways noted: “For reasons of maintainability
and operability,  it  is  easiest  to  build such a  system in an homogeneous fashion where all
gateways  are  under  a  single  authority  and  control,  as  is  the  practice  in  other  network
implementations.” (Hinden & Sheltzer, 1982, p. 3)
Even though the ARPANET was designed as a system in which gateways adapted to network
conditions  by  taking  independent  routing  decisions,  the  management  of  the  ARPANET
remained a centralised function. The apparent contradiction in routing protocol implementation
– between decentralised decision-making at gateways, and centralised control of the system –
was essential to the reliable operation of the ARPANET.
SECTION 5: TOPOLOGICAL CONTROL IN THE NSFNET
Similar contradictions were necessary for the reliable operation of the ARPANET's immediate
successor, the NSFNET. The development of the NSFNET began in 1985, with funding from the
US National Science Foundation. The NSFNET took a substantially different form than the
ARPANET, with a three-tiered hierarchical network topology: networks at institutions within a
geographical region were connected by regional networks, which in turn were connected by the
single NSFNET backbone network across regions (Harris & Gerich, 1996).
A new routing protocol was devised for the NSFNET, the Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP). It
was so named to distinguish it from "interior gateway protocols", the routing protocols which
operated  within  networks,  behind  gateways,  to  provide  IP-based  connectivity  between
computers in the same network. EGP termed these individual networks “autonomous systems”.
Administrators for each autonomous system had absolute control to choose appropriate internal
network topologies and interior gateway protocols to serve their institutional needs. However,
connectivity to other autonomous systems on the NSFNET required the use of EGP, mediated
through the regional networks, and the NSFNET backbone.
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The separation of domains of governance in EGP was intended to support the independent
evolution of individual autonomous systems. There was no need for centralised management
and coordination of hardware and software upgrades to ensure interoperability, as was the case
with the ARPANET. Ideas of autonomy were consciously designed into EGP to ensure that the
NSFNET would remain flexible and open to continued development in a variety of dimensions,
including hardware, software, and routing algorithms (Rosen, 1982).
Although networks had autonomy in internal matters,  the NSFNET was still  a hierarchical
topological structure, operated with centralised control. Regional networks controlled routing
among institutions within their regions. The NSFNET backbone controlled routing across the
NSFNET as a whole. In fact, EGP was designed pragmatically with the hierarchical topology of
the NSFNET in mind, rather than as a general purpose routing protocol for arbitrary topologies.
As the original EGP specification notes, it was “intended for a set of autonomous systems which
are  connected  in  a  tree,  with  no  cycles”,  and  “does  not  enable  the  passing  of  sufficient
information to prevent routing loops if cycles in the topology do exist” (Rosen, 1982, p.7). Even
while EGP created new possibilities for the evolution of internet technologies, it restricted the
topology of the NSFNET to a very specific form – a hierarchical structure – which has embedded
within it centralised points of control at every level.
The researchers and engineers involved with the operation and development of the NSFNET
were very aware of the limitations of EGP. In anticipation of the requirements of the future
internet, a new routing protocol had to be devised to replace EGP, to support the more complex
network topologies that might emerge in the presence of competing backbone and regional
network providers. As a network administrator involved with the design and operation of the
NSFNET backbone told me, “there was an urgency to convert” away from EGP, by designing and
deploying a successor, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), “which was basically designed to
avoid EGP’s shortcomings”.
The initial version of BGP was standardised in 1989 to address the problems with EGP, not the
least of which was support for complex network topologies (Lougheed & Rekhter, 1989). BGP
allowed loops in the topological organisation of networks, by the simple expedient of requiring
each  network  to  append  its  unique  autonomous  system  number  to  every  BGP  routing
announcement it originated or relayed. A network could simply ignore routing announcements
in which its autonomous system number was embedded, since this indicated that the routing
announcement had already transited the network once before, and was arriving as part of a loop
in  network  topology.  In  theory,  BGP made possible  the  construction  of  arbitrary  network
topologies without any need for centralised points of control.
Although  BGP  importantly  supported  future  network  topologies,  it  was  designed  without
security requirements in mind. By accidental misconfiguration, or through failures of hardware
or software, networks sometimes made claims through BGP about routes to which they could
carry traffic, which in actuality they could not reach. This is not to say that routing on the
NSFNET was insecure: the hierarchical topology of the NSFNET provided centralised points of
control through which stable routing could be assured.
A centralised database of routing information was maintained by the operators of the NSFNET
backbone, called the Policy Routing Database (PRDB). The connection of a new network to the
NSFNET, or the allocation of new IP address space to an existing connected network, could only
be made effective once these details were recorded in the PRDB. Updates to the PRDB required
coordination – typically by email – between key administrative personnel at regional networks
and the NSFNET backbone, who trusted each other to be responsible and provide accurate
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routing information.
As many of my interviewees told me, "everybody trusted everybody" in the tightly knit research
community developing and operating the NSFNET. Security was not an important issue within
the  community  of  the  NSFNET's  technical  personnel,  who  trusted  those  responsible  for
operating centralised points of control, and relied upon interpersonal trust relationships in the
everyday practice of operating the NSFNET (Mathew, 2014; Mathew & Cheshire, 2010). The
apparent lack of security in BGP was as much an outcome of its operating environment – the
hierarchical topology of the NSFNET – as it was of trust relationships among the NSFNET's
technical personnel.
The regional networks, and the NSFNET backbone, applied filters based on PRDB information
to their BGP routers, ensuring that only valid BGP routing announcements would be relayed
through them. Any routing claims which did not match information in the PRDB were stopped
from  propagating  further  through  the  NSFNET  (whether  at  the  regional  network,  or  the
NSFNET backbone), ensuring that routing on the NSFNET remained stable and secure.
The  reliable  operation  of  BGP  on  the  NSFNET  was  made  possible  through  two  kinds  of
centralised  control.  First,  through the  hierarchical  topology  of  the  NSFNET that  provided
locations at  which filters  could be applied to block incorrect  BGP routing announcements.
Second, through the central position of the NSFNET backbone that allowed its administrators to
establish the practices by which the NSFNET was operated, giving them the political capacity to
require the use of a centralised database for routing information.
The result was a hierarchical system of governance, mirroring the hierarchical topology of the
NSFNET, with a strong centre of control in the form of the PRDB at the NSFNET backbone. The
earliest routing protocol for this system, EGP, was designed for this hierarchical topology. The
design of BGP, as a successor to EGP, took place in the context of this hierarchical topology,
delegating responsibility for security in a potentially complex graph of interconnections to the
central location of the PRDB, managed by the administrators at the NSFNET backbone.
SECTION 6: DISTRIBUTED CONTROL IN THE COMPLEX
GRAPH OF THE INTERNET
The centralised controls involved in the operation of the NSFNET strongly influenced plans for
the privatisation of the NSFNET, shaping the emergence of the public internet. The technical
personnel involved in planning for the transition to a more complex network topology – with
multiple competing backbone and regional networks – anticipated that a centralised database
for  routing information,  which they termed the Route Arbiter  (RA),  would continue to  be
required for the reliable operation of BGP. A network administrator involved in setting up the
RA told me how it was intended to serve a similar function to the PRDB on the NSFNET, as an
authoritative source for routing information: "if there's any dispute for the routing, then the
Routing Arbiter will decide." Accordingly, the NSF issued a solicitation for an organisation to
take on the role of the RA for the internet (NSF, 1993).
The contract for building and maintaining the RA was awarded early in 1994 to The Merit
Network  and  the  University  of  Southern  California's  Information  Sciences  Institute.  They
created the Routing Assets Database (RADb), which remains in use today as a shared, publicly
available store of routing information, with this information maintained voluntarily by network
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administrators from autonomous systems across the internet.
Unlike the PRDB, which could be used to enforce routing policies due to its central position in
the NSFNET backbone,  the RADb was a  third party  service  which had no way to  require
networks to use it. In fact, many networks actively chose not to put their routing information
into the RADb. The reasons for this reluctance became clear in my interviews, as technical
personnel involved in building networks in this period told me how they were worried about
publicly exposing sensitive data about network configurations and customers. As one of my
interviewees pointed out, “some of the ISPs, because of competitiveness, they don't really want
other  people  to  know  who  their  clients  are;  but  if  you  update  RADb  [with  your  routing
information], it’s public.”
In consequence, the routing information in the RADb was incomplete and inconsistent, making
it an unreliable source of routing information. Several networks created their own parallel RADb
implementations,  collectively  termed Internet  Route Registries  (IRRs).  In the absence of  a
single reliable centralised database of routing information - to support the verification of routing
claims in BGP announcements - it became substantially more difficult to maintain the secure,
stable operation of network interconnection through BGP, as I describe below.
Once the NSFNET was privatised, in 1995, many private providers of internet services quickly
emerged. The resultant network topology was a complex graph of connectivity, quite unlike the
ordered hierarchy of the NSFNET. The earliest efforts to understand the topology of the internet
focused on its aggregate properties – such as the number of interconnections for each network
on the internet – observing their close conformance to power law relationships (Faloutsos,
Faloutsos, & Faloutsos, 1999). Subsequent efforts attempted to examine the actual structure of
internet topology, commenting on the difficulty of this task, since there was no longer a single
central location (such as the NSFNET backbone) from which to observe topological form (Gao,
2001; Oliveira, Pei, Willinger, Zhang, & Zhang, 2008; Oliveira & Willinger, 2010). All knowledge
of topology on the internet is necessarily partial, bounded by the locations of the networks from
which topology is observed.
Even with only partial knowledge, it is readily apparent from these studies that the topology of
the internet is far from decentralised. A few tens of networks occupy central positions in global
internet  topology,  providing  international  connectivity  spanning  countries  and  continents.
Within regions and countries, there are often dominant networks providing transit to the global
internet.  The  resulting  topological  structure  is  composed  of  multiple  centres  of  power,  at
different geographical scales.  In general,  smaller networks rely on larger networks to carry
traffic to destinations across the internet,  while larger networks employ the staff  and tools
required to manage their more highly connected topological positions, in a complex web of
technical-economic-political dependencies.
It has proved difficult to reliably operate BGP over the complex graph of internet topology, and
with only partial knowledge of topological structure. BGP has been subject to ongoing failures,
attributable to administrative mistakes and technical issues, and also to active attacks seeking to
intercept and divert internet traffic (Boothe, Hiebert, & Bush, 2006; Goldberg, 2014; Khare, Ju,
& Zhang, 2012; Schlamp, Carle, & Biersack, 2013). The responses to these problems have been
both social and technological.
Social trust relationships are essential to the functioning of the modern internet, just as they
were for the NSFNET. Ordinary users perceive the internet as stable because of social trust
relationships amongst technical personnel at networks located at key topological positions in the
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internet.  These  trust  relationships  are  produced  within  regionally  organised  professional
communities  (such  as  NANOG),  and  are  leveraged  in  the  everyday  practice  of  network
interconnection  to  enable  coordination  and  collaboration  in  ongoing  efforts  to  repair  and
mitigate routing faults propagated through BGP (Mathew, 2014; Mathew & Cheshire, 2010).
The technological effort underway at the IETF to secure BGP takes the form of the Resource
Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), an extension to BGP which provides mechanisms to allow
networks to verify the routing claims made in BGP announcements. 4RPKI relies on centralised
authorities to provide the cryptographic signatures necessary to authenticate routing claims.
The deployment of RPKI is being led by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which are the
centralised authorities responsible for uniquely allocating IP address space and autonomous
system numbers to enable the operation of BGP. Some in the internet's technical communities
view RPKI with suspicion - even though they might trust the RIRs - being wary of giving up
control of their routing in any way to a centralised authority. Others regard RPKI as a necessary
step towards securing BGP. The future is uncertain, but it is clear that the technological choice
to use (or not use) RPKI brings with it  distinctive governance arrangements,  with varying
degrees and kinds of centralisation.
In either case, the practice of operating BGP is anchored by the centralised resource allocation
functions of the RIRs, and the centralised standardisation function of the IETF; and regulated
by national and international telecommunications bodies and law. Power and control in internet
topology is necessarily distributed between functionally-specific centres, regionally organized
technical communities, the more centrally located networks in global and regional topological
structure, and national and international regulatory authorities.
CONCLUSION
As I have shown, the infrastructure of the internet has never been decentralised, nor was it
designed with decentralisation as a primary goal. At every stage of the internet's history, there
have been centres of control, necessary for the operation of internet infrastructure: from control
through  a  single  administrative  centre  in  the  ARPANET,  to  a  hierarchy  of  control  and
coordination in the NSFNET, to multiple geographically distributed centres of control in the
internet, to a possible future in which RPKI establishes new centres of control. Centralised
governance and decentralised operation of the internet are not mutually exclusive conditions.
Each is responsible for specialised functions, depending upon the other to achieve the outcome
of a stable, reliable and secure internet infrastructure.
Public debates about the internet often decry the present, in which the freedoms offered by the
internet are under attack by nation states and monopolistic corporations. These debates invoke
a past in which the internet is said to have been freer, and more decentralised, and imagine a
possible future in which freedoms might be ensured once more through the development of
decentralised technologies, immune to control.
However, as I have shown, if the internet encapsulated certain freedoms in the past, it was by no
means as a consequence of intrinsically decentralised technology. All systems have centres of
power, whether as global administrative functions (such as centralized administrative control in
the ARPANET, or the NSFNET PRDB) or as concentrations of power in topology (such as the
more central networks which control routing across specific geographical scales).
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The danger inherent in imagining and designing future internet technologies as though they are
decentralised  is  that  the  inevitable  centres  of  control  required  for  governance  will  go
unremarked upon, and in doing so will  become susceptible to political capture by the very
powers that these technologies seek to evade. It  is  critical  to anticipate and design for the
functions and accountability of centres of power in internet technologies.  For instance, the
function and accountability of centers of power may be intentionally designed, as with the
function of the PRDB as the authoritative source of routing information for the NSFNET, which
was held to account through social trust relationships among NSFNET network administrators.
Equally, the intention behind design for function and accountability may fail, or be only partially
realised, as was the case with the RADb for the public internet. In this case, the result is a
functional reliance upon networks in relatively more central topological positions to maintain
the stability and security of BGP; with these more central networks held to account through
social trust relationships among the technical personnel managing interconnections between
networks on the internet.
Restricting  the  terms  of  the  debate  around  future  internet  technologies  to  centralised  vs.
decentralised limits possible visions to purely technological solutions, whether as architectures
for  control,  or  as  mechanisms  to  escape  control.  The  emblematic  representation  of  the
centralised vision is the panopticon, a central point of perfect observation and regulation over
society (Foucault, 1975). In contrast, the decentralised vision imagines scientists and engineers
with perfect knowledge of social relations, who are able and willing to devise decentralised
technologies  capable  of  supporting  all  of  society.  Paradoxically,  both  centralised  and
decentralised  visions  are  totalising,  permeating  everywhere,  yet  located  nowhere,  existing
independent of space and time.
These visions are representative of what Haraway (1988) termed "the view from nowhere", a
perspective which presents scientific knowledge as absolute, valid everywhere and everywhen.
Alternative approaches to understanding the constitution of knowledge call for attention to the
limits to perspective, and the situated contexts, through which knowledge is constructed in
practice  (Haraway,  1988;  Lave  &  Wenger,  1991).  The  internet  is  neither  centralised  nor
decentralised: throughout its history, it has functioned through situated knowledges constructed
from partial perspectives, dependent upon topological and administrative locations. Perhaps a
new language is required to make sense of the internet as it was, is, and can be.
I propose that we think of the internet as distributed, rather than in the dichotomy between
centralised  and  decentralised.  A  perspective  on  the  internet  as  a  distributed  system
acknowledges that concentrations of power are inevitable, and sometimes necessary. To enable
potential freedoms on the internet imagined as distributed system, power must be dealt with on
its own grounds, with solutions that are as much political as they are technological. Equally,
freedom must be framed in terms of the interpersonal relationships and obligations required for
the  stable  operation  of  interdependent  technological  systems.  Technologies  provide
architectures  for  the  world;  but  we  inhabit  them,  shape  them,  and  are  shaped  by  them.
Centers of power – whether administrative or topological – must be held to account, through
regulation and representation in their function. Equally, technology must be held to account, for
the contingent processes through which practices, relations and institutional structures emerge
to  stabilize  and  order  technological  form.  The  question  to  be  asked  is  how  particular
articulations of technological form, topology, and administrative structure and practice serve the
public  good.  The answers  to  this  question are  necessarily  partial  and pragmatic,  based in
particular contexts, drawing from situated knowledges. But it is through the relations between
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these partial answers that the governance of a distributed system may be comprehended.
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FOOTNOTES
1. In general, I use the term “network” to refer to the individual computer networks which make
up the internet, as opposed to a network connecting people or things
2. IETF standards documents are available at https://ietf.org/rfc.html IENs are archived on the
website of the Postel Center, http://www.postel.org/
3. For a current count of autonomous systems visible in the inter-domain routing system, see
the entry “Number of ASes in routing system” on this report: http://www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/
4. For more information on RPKI, see the work of the IETF Secure Inter-Domain Routing
Working Group: https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/documents/.
